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The settlements around Jerusalem are, arguably, the place where one finds the deepest 
fissures between Jewish and Palestinian attitudes to the occupation. Approximately 
half of all settlers live in large bedroom suburbs adjacent to Jerusalem. For most 
Jewish Israelis these are satellites or simply neighbourhoods of the capital, a reality of 
‘facts on the ground’ and now well-absorbed into the everyday urban fabric. Israelis 
distinguish them from the settlements in the West Bank. Their Jewish-only 
populations tend not to be radical and many consider themselves apolitical; these 
residents live in the settlements because they can enjoy good housing stock at 
favourable prices, resulting in larger houses, often with gardens, than would be 
available inside the city’s greenline. For Palestinians, the settlements are built on 
stolen land, their land. For them, these neighbourhoods are colonies and the result of a 
long occupation that cements its processes of domination through planning and 
building.  
 Yet, despite the above characterisations, this bilateral opposition is not as well 
defined as might seem. Some Palestinians, either Israeli citizens or those holding 
Jerusalem Residency Certificates, have moved into the Jewish settlements. According 
to the available data at the end of 2008 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008; Hasson, 
July 15 2015), approximately 4500 Palestinians live in the settlements. They too wish 
to avail themselves of the superior facilities available in the settlements. Abowd 
(2007: 1025) suggests that these areas offer urban services and goods that make them 
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attractive for many Palestinians 'whose options in Arab neighbourhoods are not 
uncommonly more expensive and difficult to access'. Good quality housing in 
Palestinian East Jerusalem is in short supply. Poor services and a housing shortage are 
a result of both Israeli policy and practice that has left the Palestinian parts of the city 
underdeveloped since 1967. This has resulted in anomalies in the segregated housing 
profile of the city. Although quantitatively the data we noted above might be 
considered a marginal phenomenon,2 qualitatively, we suggest it is significant for a 
highly divided city like Jerusalem, and more generally, for the study of the dynamics 
of Israel’s occupation. Moreover, the “normalization” of the occupation and 
colonization of East Jerusalem is described in the literature as a static phenomenon, 
overlooking micro-scale analysis of everyday life in the city, and its effect on urban 
praxis.    
In this chapter we highlight the paradox of Jerusalem’s colonial space; on one 
hand the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem were planned, designed and marketed as 
part of the attempt to Judaize the city, while on the other hand Palestinians who move 
to these enclaves cross an invisible boundary to become one with the "settlers." In 
other words, although the settlements are usually considered as the place of ethnic 
separation, the long term effects of Israeli policy has caused some infiltration of 
Palestinians into these segregated areas. Whether this phenomenon has created the 
possibility for greater integration is slim and will be something that this chapter 
interrogates. A parallel situation applies to the academic literature on the settlements, 
where the analysis is often separated. In this article we offer a different, 
complementary view, pointing on a more nuanced understanding of the urban 
                                                 
2 The figures given in the introduction are confirmed by other sources. Out of approximately 7000 
inhabitants in French Hill there are around 50 Palestinian Arab families, mainly from Israel's northern 
region. Also, according to media reports there are 400 Palestinian families that moved to Jewish 
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dynamics of occupation and conflict while looking at set of inversions (Palestinian 
settlers in a Jewish settlement). As we will illustrate throughout this article, it is the 
very particular urban condition of a neighborhood/settlement, and the various legal 
statuses of its inhabitants, that open possibilities for the Palestinian population. 
Paradoxically, the attempt to politically and territorially annex East Jerusalem makes 
it harder to fully Judaize it.  
Our focus on neighbourhood scale as a means of understanding the very 
extensive colonial settlements around Jerusalem is far from arbitrary. Rather, the 
concept of neighbourhood, as a social and spatial entity, is discursively linked to 
modernity, modern planning and certainly nationalism (Gilette, 2010). Since the end 
of the nineteenth century, the design of modern neighbourhoods was at the core of 
urban planning; its vision was not only the physical improvement of housing 
conditions but extended to civitas, i.e. the shared community of citizens (Gilette 2010, 
2). Yet, Western planning ideologies in colonial contexts inherently embody cultural 
imperialism, and thus present a utopian idiom of neighbourhood which is based on a 
homogenous social entity; against such a background, a community where its dwellers 
are strangers to each other is thus rendered problematic. In other words, there is a 
hegemonic assumption behind colonial planning, and a sense of community is taken 
to refer to the same ethnic, national, racial or class group.    
Based on extensive fieldwork carried out from January 2006 to July 2013 
which included documentation, quantitative data collection, archival research as well 
as in-depth interviews, this article focuses on French Hill, the neighbourhood that was 
the first settlement of the Israeli Judaization of East Jerusalem. Israelis consider it to 
be politically and culturally part of unified Jerusalem. Established according to 
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modern planning episteme, this neighbourhood is inhabited by Jewish residents, but 
as noted, it is undergoing a process of demographic transformation as Palestinians, 
both with Israeli citizenship and Jerusalem Resident Certificates, have been moving 
there in recent years.  
Indeed, as we will detail, despite the escalating violence following the First 
and especially the Second Intifada,3 and the ongoing discourses of enmity, Israeli 
residents in French Hill found themselves facing a dilemma: ‘to sell or not to sell’, 
using Rabinowitz’s words (Rabinowitz, 1994),  property to Palestinians. While such a 
dilemma has been explored by several studies in relation to Jewish-Arab mixed cities 
(Yacobi, 2009), we suggest that the case of French Hill may exhibit some differences 
to areas inside Israel. For if we consider the matter in terms of Palestinian 
sensibilities, the question of  'to buy or not to buy' property becomes one of existential 
concern, as French Hill is one of the first settlements built on occupied Palestinian 
land in East Jerusalem, as well as a neighbourhood ostensibly built for, and offering 
public services to, Jewish residents only. For Palestinians who consider buying into 
French Hill, the fear of being branded a collaborator will always lie just below the 
surface of everyday life. 
 
New colonialism: the establishment of a modern neighbourhood 
Despite the fact that the colonisation of East Jerusalem was declared in a 1968 
government decision taken at national level, it is the professional knowledge of 
experts that contributed to the implementation of such policy. The first step was the 
use of the legal system; in January 1968 the Land Ordinance for expropriating land 
through the Planning and Construction Law 1965 was invoked. This allowed the 
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expropriation of land for public use without any specified use, whether for housing, 
parks or infrastructure. As a result of this act, 3345 dunams were expropriated in the 
first instance, including the area to become French Hill, in the northern part of  
'unified Jerusalem'.  
Figure 1: North East Jerusalem area a general view from North East 
French Hill stands at a critical topographical point for the newly expanded 
Israeli Jerusalem. From it, there is a visual axis to the Old City, while at the same 
time, the neighbourhood pivots between the main road to the northern West Bank and 
to the south, East Jerusalem. It is also on the road that connects Mount Scopus, and its 
Hebrew University campus, with Israeli West Jerusalem. The connections help to 
reinforce an Israeli weak spot from the divided topography of 1948-67 and point 
towards future settlement. Certainly, the location of Jerusalem's new neighbourhoods, 
including French Hill, did not depend upon the availability of land or planning logic, 
but rather as noted by former Israeli City Engineer (1992-4), Elinoar Barzaki, 'it was a 
clear political agenda to re-shape the city's boundaries' (Barzaki 1989, 30).  
 The initial demographic objective for French Hill was designed to house 2400 
Jewish families. This number increased later due to a decision to allocate 37 dunams 
to the expansion of the Hebrew University Campus (Yacobi, 2008). Public buildings 
such as schools and kindergartens were located on the East slope of the hill, protected 
from the western wind, and the housing zones were designed around the hilltop. In the 
spirit of modern neighbourhood planning at the time, the design scheme proposed the 
separation of cars from pedestrians, while most of the housing blocks were planned as 
four storey buildings. At the time, many of the planning decision reflected a cutting 
edge approach to modern housing. 
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 In December 1969, the Rogers' Plan (after US Secretary of State William 
Rogers) was published, calling for a shared administration of the city by 
representatives of the three main religions. Such a recommendation was rejected by 
the Israeli authorities and as a result the aspirations for low-rise housing in French 
Hill were pushed aside and three to four additional floors were added to each building 
in order to intensify the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem. Here the inclusion of 
architecture and planning as part of the geopolitical tool-box is essential; even more 
than most other cultural representations, buildings are the manifestation of the 
political power of the state. In the case of French Hill, housing was a key player, and 
the geopolitical effect of modern architecture and planning has had to do with the 
ability to produce not only a tangible manifestation in territory, but also 'new forms of 
collective association, personal habit and daily life' (Holston 1989, 31). This is 
noticeable in the planning outline of French Hill where the south-west side of the 
neighbourhood was left vacant in order to enable a gaze towards the Old City and the 
Temple Mount.  
 The attempt to create a visual axis between the frontier new settlement and the 
historical centre of Jerusalem's Old City contributed to the symbolic construction of 
the settlement being part of 'united Jerusalem'. Such techniques formed components 
of wider discourse and practices that characterised Israeli architecture and planning 
after 1967. The unilateral reunification of Jerusalem challenged Israeli architects and 
planners who immediately after the 1967 war, were asked 'to cover the recently 
occupied land with built facts on the ground in order to foster the desired unity of the 
city under Israeli rule' (Nitzan-Shiftan  2004, 231).  
The architectural response to this challenge was expressed in designing the 
new neighbourhoods not so much as unadulterated modern buildings but within a 
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Middle Eastern stylistic vernacular of arched windows, rusticated stone and stepped 
houses. Significantly, such an orientalist interpretation uses its architectural scale and 
forms as a means of symbolically appropriating the Palestinian built landscape. A 
telling illustration of this trend is expressed in the design outline of Tzameret Habira 
(Figure 2: Tzameret Habira selling brochure. Source: Jerusalem Municipality 
archive), a housing compound built on the eastern slope of French Hill, facing the 
Judean Desert and the Palestinian village of Issawiya. This part of French Hill was 
designed to form low terraces that hug the hillside in a way that is emulates the 
architecture of Palestinian villages. The project houses mainly Jewish immigrants 
from the US, Canada and Western Europe and was considered the most luxurious 
zone of the neighbourhood: 
 
All housing will be built in one or two storey units. These are 
designed so that all houses have uninterrupted views […] The 
general architecture will be Mediterranean in character and the 
overall effect should be that given from afar by the typical Arab 
village which is built inconspicuously into the hills (French Hill 
Housing Brochure undated, The Jerusalem Municipality 
Archive). 
  
 The so-called Arab village in the above description is portrayed as natural; it 
becomes a de-politicised and a-historical object that responds to the local topography 
in good taste, and is seen only from a distance. Nevertheless, this discursive 
appropriation is no other than a purification process based on mimicry which occurs 
in the colonial arena of those in power, the professionals, who desire to create an 
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oriental landscape as a mechanism of symbolic indigenisation of the settlers. This 
approach, we suggest, has been a mechanism of normalizing the Jewish inhabitants' 
sense of place, as noted in one of the interviews: 
  
When we came to live here, the view from the window was 
empty – there was no one there -- maybe a house or two. The 
kids used to play in the valley. Today, you see, there are all 
these illegal [Palestinian] houses in front of us (Interview with 
Ariella, an Israeli resident January 29, 2006) 
 
 As mentioned, the attempt to colonise East Jerusalem was not just territorial, 
but rather to create a new sense of belonging and superiority among the Jerusalem 
(Jewish) inhabitants in their new neighbourhoods. Thus, for example, special attention 
was given to the new street names that were named after military events understood 
by Israelis to be heroic, such as: Mavo Hamaavak (the Struggle Alley), the Partizan 
Alley, Mavo Hahitnadvut (the Volunteering Alley, commemorating Jewish volunteers 
during World War II), and HaEtzel and HaLehi Streets, recognising Jewish militant 
groups who fought the British for independence in the late 1940s (Report from the 
Committee of names and streets, No. 47, 14.5.1973, Jerusalem Municipality Archive). 
To sum up this section, locating French Hill as the first settlement after the 
1967 war to link West Jerusalem and the Hebrew University Campus on Mount 
Scopus had a fundamental role in the process of the Israeli territorialisation of the 
city. It marked the edges of the 'unification' of the city post 1967, and through the 
planning apparatus produced a seemingly natural and historically based frontier, 
which enabled the extensive development of Jewish neighbourhoods on Palestinian 
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expropriated land. By so doing, an ongoing process of normalizing the occupation of 
East Jerusalem was taking place, producing a new cognitive map of, a unified 
Jerusalem as the Jewish Capital. 
Map 1: about here 
The urban frontier  
The location of French Hill with its proximity to a number of Palestinian areas, such 
as Issawiya and Shuafat, meant that total control or removal of Palestinians in the 
Jewish neighbourhood would be difficult or impossible. Both geographically and 
symbolically the frontier location of French Hill is significant; it is geographically 
surrounded by contested landscapes, today including a portion of the separation wall.4 
It watches (and is indeed watched by) Shuafat, the nearby Palestinian refugee camp, 
and it marks the edge of the city as it is situated by th e main road that leads to the 
Judaean desert. Indeed, as argued by Pullan (2011), studies of contested frontier zones 
tend to focus on states or regions rather than cities, where, according to Ron (2003) 
the colonial frontier is conceived as a remote and radicalised region, a resource of 
Terra Nullius. On the other hand, despite strict attempts to command urban frontiers 
through controlling practices such as planning, housing regulations, etc, cities do not 
normally have the apparatus available to states to control frontiers (Pullan, 2011). The 
situation of French Hill is an example of such an urban frontier. There, the increasing 
                                                 
4 Within the scope of this paper, we are not able to discuss the political dimension of this 
structure. However, it is important to note that the construction of the wall in Jerusalem/al-
Quds represents a special case; it creates a tangible delineation of greater Israeli Jerusalem, 
including many of its settlements (that is, the area 'annexed' by Israel in 1967 – illegally, 
according to international law). It also includes some Palestinian areas that have been ‘cherry-
picked’ by Israel. The immediate effect of the wall is to annex 'de-facto' the 
settlements/neighbourhoods within the municipal boundaries (in total more than 4,000 
dunams). The Palestinian neighbourhoods, constituting 3,200 dunams within Jerusalem’s 
municipal boundaries, are excluded; that is, they are on the other side of the wall.  Thus their 
inhabitants unilaterally are deprived of their status as Jerusalemites. Around 40,000 Palestinian 
Jerusalemites are separated from the city and its services, and an additional 60,000-90,000 
Palestinian Jerusalemites living in the areas surrounding Jerusalem are isolated from the city. 
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movement of Palestinians into the neighbourhood is a result of the geopolitical 
conditions where Israeli surveillance and control over East Jerusalem's Palestinian 
neighbourhoods cause unequal distribution of resources and infrastructure, poverty, 
social and physical deterioration.  
A closer view of daily activities reveals that Palestinian presence in the 
neighbourhood is due to public services that are located there. For example, the local 
commercial centre in HaEtzel Street serves not just Jewish inhabitants but also 
Palestinians from nearby neighbourhoods such as Issawiya, Shuafat, Beit Hanina and 
Beit La'hiya as customers.  The local branch of HaPoalim Bank, in HaHagana Street 
serves both the Jewish and Arab population, as does the post office in HaHail Street, 
and a car insurance agency that is owned by a Palestinian. The unequal distribution of 
infrastructure and services between West and East Jerusalem is indeed one of the 
main reasons why Palestinians cross the border (Conflict in Cities interviews archive, 
Northern Site, file 14, 2005). 
The proximity of the French Hill neighbourhood to the Hebrew University 
Campus attracts Palestinian students (the majority are Israeli citizens) who rent 
accommodation in the neighbourhood. Sharing apartments is very common, and there 
are some cases of mixed Palestinians and Israelis. HaEtzel and Bar-Kochva streets are 
the most common areas for students, due to their proximity to the University and 
because they are relatively cheap. No formal Palestinian residency statistics exist, but 
from a survey of names on mailboxes in these streets, we learned that the number of 
Palestinians living in this area is stable. For example: in HaEtzel Street 17, from 24 
apartments 5 of them had Arabic names written in Hebrew characters on their 
mailboxes in 2005, with 6 Arabic names in 2010. In HaEtzel Street 16, from 21 
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apartments, 4 of them Arabic names written in Hebrew characters in 2005 and 2 in 
2010. In Bar-Kochva Street, 16 from 12 apartments, 1 of them with an Arabic name 
written in Hebrew letters on their mailbox and the same in 2010. The Palestinian 
students use all the facilities in the area, including the bank, post office, supermarket 
and some coffee shops (Interview with Saja Kilani, August 8, 2006). This is perceived 
as a threat by some Jewish residents:  
 
I went to the café in the commercial centre; it was full of Arabs. 
I didn’t feel comfortable and thus I asked for a take a way 
coffee… We don’t [want to] drink coffee in Ramallah. There is 
an economic interest for the shops in the commercial centre and 
thus Arabs are there (Interview with Bracha, an Israeli resident, 
January 29, 2006). 
 
Like other colonial cities, despite the spatio-political divisions along ethno-national 
and racial lines (Robinson, 1997), there is an ongoing flow of labour (in the Jerusalem 
case, Palestinian workers) to the white neighbourhoods (in Jerusalem, to French Hill 
and many other Jewish neighbourhoods). This was observed as early as the beginning 
of the 1970s (Giva'aton, the French Hill local newspaper, March 1975, The Jerusalem 
Municipality Archive). 
From the early 2000s, during the escalating violence and tension between 
Israel and the Palestinians, the frontier characteristics of the French Hill area attracted 
some major Palestinian bombings and other attacks.5 Hence, the Palestinian presence 
in French Hill was heavily contested and feared by many Israelis. One of these 
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conflicts was around the presence of Palestinian children and youth in a playground 
situated at the edge of the neighbourhood, that faced east towards their own village of 
Issawiya and was far superior to any play area in their own vicinity. As a result of 
continued protests by the Jewish residents of French Hill, the Jerusalem Municipality 
removed most of the playground furniture in order to stop the Issawiya children from 
coming to this playground. The displeasure of some of the Jewish population in the 
neighbourhood to the use and/or appropriation of space by Palestinians is expressed in 
the words of Uri Michaeli, the head of the local municipality of the French Hill 
neighbourhood at that time:  
 
Gan Hashlosha was built as a memorial for three soldiers who 
were killed in Lebanon. No one has ever forbid Issawiya's 
children from entering the playground and they were welcomed 
at first, but in the last two years the place has become a real 
bother. Issawiya's children took over the playground, drove out 
the Jewish children with threats and knives, teased the adults 
and harass the girls. Whole families started coming to the 
playground, although it has no sanitary facilities for so many 
visitors. The children of French Hill stopped coming. The 
activity in the garden lasted till late at night, with shouting and 
screaming, until many of the neighbours seriously considered 
moving from their houses (Interview with Uri Michaeli, the 
head of the local council of French Hill neighbourhood at that 
time, September, 29 2000). 
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 Indeed, below the surface of the arguments presented above, there is an 
additional layer, elusive but also significant, that is linked to the fear and anxiety 
associated with the presence of the Other. As the works of Sandercock (2000) and 
Bauman (2003) reveal, the fear of the Other is a central component in the discourse of 
urban politics. Furthermore, the presence of fear in urban space is not a simple 
reflection of social reality but rather itself a mechanism that produces ‘reality’, one 
that is mediated through discourses of fear and order. This is illustrated in the words 
of the head of the communal administration French Hill:  
 
Tomorrow I will be asked to open an Arab school, and the day 
after to build a mosque. Each person should live in his 
neighbourhood – as I do not want to have Haredim [Orthodox 
Jews] here neither do I want Arabs... I am afraid that French Hill 
will be occupied by Issawiya (Gideon Yeger, the head of the 
local council of French Hill neighbourhood at that time, cited in 
Hasson July 24, 2009). 
 
Fear in its political dimension is intensified when the city undergoes 
significant transformations that produce political discourse that is, in turn, shaped by 
those that fear. To some extent, the presence of Palestinians coming from the 
neighbouring Palestinian districts, as well as Palestinian students renting apartments 
and using public space in French Hill is a good example of the way in which the 
discourse of fear focuses on the 'what and whom' we should be afraid of. For Israelis 
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fear is mostly intermittent, sometimes suppressed through their culture of occupation, 
but occasionally made immediate and visible through challenges like the situation in 
French Hill. Because they are under occupation, the fear of Palestinians could be seen 
as more consistent and unbroken, but for them as well, French Hill makes it clear and 
visible as they venture into ‘enemy’ territory with only limited means of escape or 
relief. Important to both groups, and to our discussion here is the spatial dimension of 
fear, which '...does not just involve a relationship between the individual and a variety 
of societal structures; it is embedded in a network of moral and political geographies' 
(Pain and Smith, 2003). 
 
Strategies for survival 
It is important to reiterate the primary reason why most Palestinians have moved to 
French Hill: they desire a better place to live. Homes and neighbourhoods, with a 
good level of housing stock and neighbourhood services, are generally denied to them 
in their own communities. But although French Hill offers better physical 
accommodation, is it a better place to live? This may be considered from two points 
of view, Israeli and Palestinians in French Hill and the Israeli reaction to their inroads. 
With respect to the latter, opposition has become more entrenched and more vocal. 
While the presence of Palestinians in public spaces such as the French Hill 
commercial centre and playground might be perceived by Jewish residents as a 
relatively minor phenomenon that can be controlled, the permanent presence of 
Palestinians who buy and rent property in the neighbourhood is a much more 
contested subject. There has been not only an institutionalised attempt to severely 
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limit Palestinians from living in property in areas designated for Israeli habitation,6 
but also an extensive public discourse intended to reinforce the ban; for example, in 
September 2010, a public ‘Rabbis’ Letter’, called for Jews not to let Arabs rent 
apartments in their communities. This declaration states that anyone renting his 
apartment to an Arab is doing harm – both in the eyes of God and for his fellow man. 
As far as Palestinians are concerned, the advantages and disadvantages of 
living in French Hill are far more complex. The wider geopolitical conditions with 
respect to the city of Jerusalem should also be noted here as a central component in 
the explanation of this phenomenon. For many years, the Israeli authorities have 
pursued a policy of limiting new housing in Palestinian areas of Jerusalem, and more 
recently, the demolition of homes built without permits. For Palestinians who have the 
blue Jerusalem residency ID card, living outside Jerusalem’s new borders endangers 
their status as Jerusalemites,7 while for Palestinians with Israeli citizenship this new 
reality complicates their mobility.8 Hence, after the construction of the wall began, 
thousands of Palestinians returned to the city in order to protect their residency status 
as well as some of their rights. As a result, there has been an intensification of the 
housing shortage in East Jerusalem, with an accompanying rapid increase in housing 
prices in of about 50 percent (International Peace Cooperation Report, 2005) that 
created pressure on the housing market. All of these factors have resulted in some 
                                                 
6 For example, many mortgages have been available only to people who have served in the 
Israel Defence Forces. All Jewish Israelis are routinely conscripted but Arab Israelis are 
exempted. 
7 ID cards are issued by the Israeli authorities on their own terms. Residency in Jerusalem is 
based upon an Israeli census carried out in 1967; Palestinians who spend time outside of 
Jerusalem may lose their status, and those who marry West Bank residents may not obtain 
Jerusalem status for them. Besides the right to live in the city, they enjoy Israeli social welfare 
programmes. They are not citizens of Israel. 
8 This refers to the approximately 20 percent of Israel’s population that is Palestinian, who 
became citizens in 1948; they are subject to Israeli laws and like Israeli Jews, are not supposed 
to pass into the Palestinian areas of the West Bank. 
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Palestinians with Jerusalem ID or Israeli citizenship, who have the economic ability, 
moving into Jewish neighbourhoods.  
This phenomenon reveals further complexities: Israeli Palestinians who have a 
longer history of living near or next to Israelis and usually speak fluent Hebrew tend 
to be more comfortable with such a move. Jerusalem Palestinians, who may or may 
not speak good Hebrew and live under more recent and harsh occupation, with 
pressure from their fellow Palestinians to avoid fraternising with Israelis, are not.  At 
the same time, it should be noted that this is an upper middle class practice; mortgages 
are generally not available for such purchases by Palestinians, and cash payments are 
the norm.  Yet, although economic means makes the endeavour possible, the potential 
for political pitfalls are evident in an interview with Mustafa, a Palestinian who is an 
Israeli citizen, who moved to the French Hill in 2005: 
 
In the year 2000 we almost bought a 'villa' in [Israeli] Pisgat 
Zeev. Then the Second Intifada started, there was a tension and I 
knew that we could not move to Pisgat Zeev [...] So, we 
searched for a place we liked. We did not want to live in 
[Palestinian] Shuafat; the municipal services, schools and 
infrastructure are not good there. Because of the Intifada, there 
is often a flying checkpoint at the entrance to Shuafat, and if 
they stop you, you cannot get to work on time in the city 
(Interview with Mustafa, April 13, 2010). 
 
Mustafa notes that French Hill is close to some of the Palestinian commercial and 
social centres such as Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Joz, Beit Hanina and the main road to 
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Ramallah, thus enabling contact with the Palestinian side, while on the other hand his 
family can enjoy '...modern infrastructure, municipal services. Here there is security 
and sovereignty, it is not abandoned' (Interview with Mustafa, April 13, 2010). These, 
as well as nearby Shuafat, are mostly middle class Palestinian neighbourhoods 
supplying shops and services appropriate to their residents. The geopolitics of the 
situation is tempered by specific needs and familiar practices. 
Palestinians who wish to buy a property in the French Hill must negotiate with 
Jewish estate agents or deal directly with individual Jewish vendors who will often 
maximize their material gain in selling property to Palestinians. In some cases they 
are very reluctant to sell to Palestinians. This issue was raised by Antuan, a Christian-
Palestinian lawyer, and an Israeli citizen who is married to a Jerusalem Palestinian. 
Antuan bought his apartment in 2002; it was during the Second Intifada and a spate of 
attacks and the killing of Israelis in the French Hill area brought house process down. 
Despite the relatively low housing prices at that time, Antuan mentioned that some of 
the Israeli sellers refused to sell their apartments to Palestinians (Interview with 
Antuan, a Palestinian who owns a house in French Hill, April 9, 2010).  
Indeed, the discussion of the politics of “free market” dynamic vis a vis ethnic 
and racial exclusion is well-known in the literature, such as the case of American 
racial neighbourhood covenants excluding African-Americans from buying or renting 
housing in “white” neighbourhoods (Massey and Denton 1993). It compares closely 
to Jerusalem where the "fear of Arabness", a term coined by Dahan-Kalev (2010), is a 
central mechanism of racializing the Other, i.e representing and defining Palestinians 
on the basis of racial categories that are used to justify social biases and 
discrimination. With great significance for our case, Balibar (1991) points to the new 
patterns of racism that are formed and organized around sociological signifiers to 
18 
 
replace biological markings. In other words, the predominant factor in this form of 
racism is not the biological difference between ethno-racial groups but rather the 
presence of minorities in urban space, their movement through social and territorial 
boundaries, and the perceptions, especially by the dominant majority groups, of these 
conditions. 
However, beyond the social obstacles, as a lawyer who represents other 
Palestinian families that purchase property in the French Hill, Antuan stated: 
 
Arabs who buy here are economically stable, so they can buy 
every apartment they are interested in. I personally know around 
twenty families who bought property [...] If you look at these 
families – they are each in a better economic situation than the 
average Israeli family. They can afford 'tosefet Aravi' (Interview 
with Antuan, a Palestinian who owns a house in French Hill, 
April 9, 2010).  
 
The Hebrew term ‘tosefet Aravi’, used by Antuan, has also been repeated by 
other interviewees. Literally meaning ‘an additional price for Arabs’, charged by 
Israeli vendors, it has become a common expression, codifying the sole access of 
Palestinians to the housing market in Jewish neighbourhoods, while financially 
ensuring that Palestinian buyers offer 20 to 25 percent more for property in the 
neighbourhood. An estate agent who lives and works in French Hill states: 
 
The Arab buyers are offering better prices than the Israelis… it 
creates a dilemma for the vendor. Some Jews will never sell 
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their flats to Arabs, they say 'Ill never do it to my neighbours' 
but some others will. As a property agent I will never do it 
(Interview with Abraham, January 29, 2006). 
 
Indeed, contrary to the image of a backward or less worldly social group as often 
presented in Israeli public discourse, Palestinian residents who are economically able 
to buy property in French Hill are upper middle class and often better educated than 
the average Israeli residents; many of them are professionals or academics searching 
for a better housing environment, as stated by Mustafa: 
 
We were looking for an apartment… We wanted a 
neighbourhood that we liked, with good infrastructure. French 
Hill is a nice place to live; the neighbours knew we are Arabs, 
they were nice… All we want is to live peacefully (Interview 
with Mustafa, April 13, 2010). 
 
But despite the fact that class and the modern western life-style of the 
Palestinian inhabitants of French Hill is an implicit condition for their presence there, 
from the Jewish side it is just the beginning of a rapid slide to losing demographic 
dominance in the neighbourhood. This dilemma, as suggested by Rabinowitz (1994) 
accentuates the tension between the collective ethos of Zionist territoriality and, what 
has become central to the Israel’s economy, a capitalist mode of free housing market 
dynamics where personal economic gain dominates. In the words of a Jewish resident,  
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In French Hill, especially in Ha-Etzel Street, the process [of 
Arabization] is rapid. The Arabs in our area are upper middle 
class. They come from the North [of Israel] – one of them is a 
lawyer and following his arrival another member of his family 
joined… It starts with the arrival of good people but I am afraid 
that during the years some negative elements will also live here 
(Interview with Ariella, an Israeli resident January 29, 2006).  
 
In the end, housing does not necessarily make up all of the key features of 
neighbourhood, and this is where hope for some further integration meets a stumbling 
block. According to our findings, Palestinians in French Hill do not partake of many 
local activities. They do not send their children to the local, Hebrew-language school:  
 
Initially we did not want to live in a neighbourhood which is 
entirely Jewish since there is a problem with the education of 
our children... when we decided to move to the French Hill we 
decided to send our children to the Anglican School, though it is 
expensive and far away (Interview with Antuan, a Palestinian 
who owns a house in French Hill, April 9, 2010).  
 
Beyond that, Antuan echoes a common experience among Palestinians residing in  
French Hill who do not socialise with Jewish Israelis, and their use of neighbourhood 
shops and services is minimal and curtailed. Mustafa notes: 
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We do our shopping in Shuafat, but once a week we go to the 
shopping mall [in Pisgat Zeev]. We have no contact with the 
cultural events here, the kids do not go to after-school activities 
here; the piano teacher is coming to teach them here, at home; 
we take them to visit their [non-Israeli] friends in other 
neighbourhoods. They have no reason to play outside (Interview 
with Mustafa, April 13, 2010). 
  
Palestinians may have moved to French Hill for better housing. But at any meaningful 
level, they are not recognised as welcome residents of their neighbourhood, cannot 
participate, through both their own reluctance and Israeli distrust. This leaves them 
isolated, even caged, as a small minority in an often unfriendly, sometimes hostile, 
environment. 
 
The possibilities for participation 
In French Hill, both rights and participation are key issues, and the Palestinians fall 
short in both. Much has been said of the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996) in relation 
to the situation of Palestinian citizens in Israel (Yacobi, 2009) and here we would like 
to focus instead on the question of participation. This can take a variety of forms; an 
extensive discussion of the pros and cons of participation is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it is worth saying that we consider it here primarily in terms of an 
urban culture with the necessary overtones of political life that the situation in 
Jerusalem dictates.  
Seyla Benhabib (2002) makes the important points that participation in a 
culture exists from within that culture, and although by nature it is shared, it may also 
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be contested. While clearly there is more than one culture living in French Hill, we 
might question to what extent the place itself offers some cultural parameters that, for 
Palestinians and Israelis, are in some ways shared and certainly contested. To this, we 
might add that participation requires some level of corporate activity or public life; it 
is not an individual act.  
To understand how place may play a role in public participation, it is 
worthwhile to see French Hill as a modern westernised neighbourhood in the context 
of an older urban tradition of Middle Eastern cities. These cities had quarters where 
different ethnic groups were not necessarily rigidly divided but nonetheless 
recognisable as such; the cities also had areas where people mixed, mostly in market 
areas, including coffeehouses, baths, water sources. They saw a variety of faces, heard 
different languages and accents, and to some extent they discussed or argued about 
the matters of the day; markets were political places. In the late Ottoman period, 
Jerusalem was a more mixed city, and more nuanced in its ethnic strata (Tamari, 
2011). 
To good extent a local and customary order persisted in the city although this 
was rarely comprehended by foreign (mostly Western) travellers who, from the 
nineteenth century, describe the city has having four quarters based upon religious 
divisions; Tamari (2011: 66) argues that the confessional city was primarily 
reinforced by the British after 1917. Whilst it would be difficult to say that people had 
any more trust in or regard for the ethnically other than they do today, the possibilities 
of participating in city life were probably more institutionalised and embedded in the 
urban structures. We can talk about a spectrum of space from segregation, as in 
mosques, churches and synagogues, to integration, as in markets. In between, people 
(men) frequented favourite cafes, where they met friends and acquaintances and 
23 
 
where they knew they were welcome, and avoided ones where they felt 
uncomfortable. On the whole, they maintained neighbourly relations that formed the 
basis of trade, patronage and more generally, everyday life.  In modern terminology, 
we could say that the city centre provided places for mediating difference. 
As we noted above, Israel has for the most part embraced modern planning 
and architecture which, as disciplines, have mostly neglected such a mediative 
environment; at best, they have organised cities and neighbourhoods in terms of 
functional typologies with little reflection of the nuanced social structures that are 
common in the Middle East. At worst, they have extended and reinforced the planning 
policies that separated peoples on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Following in the 
footsteps of British planning (Kendall, 1948) the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem 
have been designed as autonomous enclaves, divided from Palestinian areas by 
valleys and bypass roads rather than by urban places in which social and economic 
activity might develop. If we look today at where there is some interaction between 
Palestinians and Israelis, it often happens in the most mundane areas of life – markets, 
petrol stations, some restaurants, or in French Hill, in the supermarket, post office and 
bank (Conflict in Cities fieldwork archive, Northern Site, files 4, 13, 23, 24). 
However these places are relatively few and encounters tend to be fleeting.  
With respect to the geopolitics of neighbourhoods, there is a clash of scales, 
between everyday life and the big political picture. French Hill can be said to some 
extent to be a microcosm of the Palestine-Israel conflict and rather than the slow and 
undramatic ‘murmur of urban political discourse’ that Appadurai (1996) claims to 
commonly characterise the confluence of local and global, Jerusalem’s high profile 
means that even the most innocuous of actions are quickly thrust onto the world stage. 
At the same time, the lack of balance between the everyday acts of Israelis and 
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Palestinians reflects the asymmetry of the larger political situation, and people who 
are caught up in these circumstances are forced to live in a big but skewed picture. In 
short, daily acts regularly become issues of sovereignty and, as Hannah Arendt (1958, 
repr. 1989, 234-235) has made clear, plurality and sovereignty do not mix.  
One might ask to what extent living in French Hill is for its Palestinian 
minority an act of resistance, in itself, a form of participation as a member of one’s 
nation. For example, whilst many of the middle class Palestinian residents of French 
Hill see their residency as a ‘strategy of survival’, some underline the political 
dimension of their decision to move to a colonial neighbourhood:  
 
...we broke the stereotypes against Arabs. They [the Jewish 
neighbours] feel that we are part of this place… If you will 
measure the socio-economic ability of the Arabs in the 
neighbourhood, it is much higher than the average Jewish 
people... Our presence here has a symbolic meaning, it is even a 
symbolic de-colonization (Interview with Antuan, a Palestinian 
who owns a house in French Hill, April 9, 2010).  
 
Whilst this may offer some satisfaction as an act of ongoing subversion, at 
least at a symbolic level, the problem of everyday participation in one’s 
neighbourhood and community is not solved. Rather, there is the question to what 
extent Palestinians need to relinquish parts of their own culture in order to achieve 
even a minimal level of integration. How compromised are they? To buy or not to buy 
becomes an existential question. This seems to be most important in the question of 
Palestinian polity; not only how much can they participate in Israeli culture and 
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institutions in French Hill, but to what extent are they participant in their own culture 
and politics if they live in such a neighbourhood? While they may enjoy some small 
level of acceptance within Israeli circles in French Hill, this is fundamentally opposed 
to the wishes of the larger Palestinian entity that desires the end of the occupation and 
their own liberation. Arendt’s basic description of the polity of the polis as ‘speaking 
and acting together’ (Arendt 1958, repr. 1989: 183) is mostly removed from the 
French Hill Palestinians who live apart from the wider Palestinian collective. It is at 
this fundamental level – not in the with-holding of integration with Israelis, but in 
their separation from Palestinian society - that participation is primarily denied to 
them. 
 
Conclusion 
Ideally, the urban sphere, in its density and diversity, could serve as a space that is 
“open to flows of people” (Katznelson 1995, 57). Such a liberal perspective relies 
heavily on the belief that the city has the potential for the production of an “enabling 
space” that might disrupt the existing hierarchies and boundaries of ethnic and class 
structures. Yet, as we have detailed, such a view is only partial in the context of 
Jerusalem’s settlements, which is divided not only along the Jewish/Arab partition but 
also according to other ethnic divisions that stem from the nature of the Israeli settler 
society. 
 The most significant contribution of this article is that it looks not solely at 
macro processes namely occupation, colonization and bordering but rather its analysis 
refers to facts on the ground from the point of view of the ground. This 
complementary view of geopolitical processes reveals the paradoxical situation of 
colonial territories such as French Hill. As we have detailed, French Hill is both a 
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well-established settlement, “normalized” by different practices such as architecture 
and infrastructure planning, while at the same time its frontier location on the old 
border makes it a space of negotiation, unexpected migration and habitation. The 
paradox of contested frontier and work-a-day suburb is typical of many Israeli 
settlements, but French Hill is particularly vulnerable to such a strained dichotomy 
because of the challenge to the homogeneous Jewish population by its Palestinian 
residents. 
Palestinians are a small minority in French Hill and likely to remain so for the 
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, their presence carries with it larger implications and 
even some concrete benefits. The Palestinians do enjoy better housing and municipal 
services; for some there is the sense of beating the system, and for others, a form of 
resistance. The Israeli interests and concerns are more difficult to pinpoint and many 
would argue that the phenomenon is wholly negative; but at the risk of sounding 
patronising, it would be fair to say that the Palestinian residents of French Hill are a 
small chink in the stone of a politics-driven colonial planning system that is one-
sided, unjust and needing of reform; also important is that Israelis see Palestinians and 
hear Arabic in a city where many segments of the population never encounter it.  
 But more to the point would be to look at the Palestinian residents in the 
neighbourhood as it pertains to both groups: can we talk about shared space under 
occupation in any way? After all, although multicultural cities today in the West are 
seen as dealing with the other, particularly where destinies may exist in tandem. To a 
small extent, public and commercial spaces in French Hill are shared and at a minimal 
level, some experiences of the neighbourhood become applicable to all. This is typical 
of many middle class Western cities where, in Bauman’s words, ‘strangers meet, 
remain in each other’s proximity, and interact for a long time without stopping being 
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strangers to each other’ (Bauman 2006, 6). At the same time, Jerusalem is a highly 
contested city and normal comments on, and aspirations for, multiculturalism seems 
feeble here. The immigration of ethnic and racial minorities to 'white' middle-class 
neighbourhoods is not a peculiar Israeli phenomenon and has been covered widely in 
the literature; however, the discourses of inclusion and exclusion, borders and 
boundaries, demographic control, security and separation attached to it 'resonates with 
a long-standing discourse among the public as well as among scholars and politicians 
who frame Israel as a regional 'ghetto' — which is both 'refuge' and 'island'' 
(Monterescu, 2009).  
Two interrelated possibilities of sharing may be cited in the French Hill 
example, possibilities which in themselves are powerful, although it is too soon to 
understand their impact. Firstly, both groups share the problem of having their private 
lives regularly catapulted into the public realm and world stage. Yet, both groups are 
middle class, educated and living relatively conventional lives in this suburb of 
Jerusalem. This raises the second point: in many ways these two groups are 
remarkably similar economically and professionally if not politically. Ultimately, will 
such profound similarities help to form a quiet if not friendly sharing of the 
neighbourhood? And, would not a middle-class initiative, like establishing a joint 
Palestinian-Israel school with instruction in Hebrew and Arabic, going a long way to 
easing tensions and preparing the next generation for a certain amount of shared 
space? It is in a neighbourhood like French Hill, with its middle class populations, 
that such schemes might bear fruit. 
Although this research raises many questions at this point, it does make clear 
that geopolitics in contested cities is happening at the minute and everyday level.  As 
we have discussed in this article, the geopolitics of cities and the shaping of their 
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territorial borders and social boundaries - both externally (the city in relation to its 
region) and internally (between the city's neighbourhoods) - are determined not solely 
through military acts but rather, as we suggested throughout this paper, urban 
geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces attached to technologies 
of control, in our case, planning. At the same time, patterns of migration such as the 
case of Palestinians moving to French Hill and the flow capital in the housing free 
market are much more loosely related to formal structures, and sometimes act as a 
controlling or unjust policy that has backfired.  
As we have shown, geopolitical perspective is a useful analytical framework 
for studying planning and the production of urban space that subverts the traditional 
distinction between domestic and international affairs habitually taken for granted in 
political geography. We would also conclude that the emergence of Palestinian 
inhabitants in Jerusalem's colonial neighbourhoods that were established after the 
1967 war, mark new forms of urban dynamics that form inclusion and exclusion as 
well as some new spatio-political possibilities.  
Following Holston (1989) we can conclude that the city is a space in which 
residents oppose and undermine dominant narratives of the state and capital. 
Simultaneously, communities in the city create alternative local narratives that do not 
necessarily reflect the rationale of the nation or of capital; nor do they reflect the 
social hierarchy or the power relations that create it. As this article shows, the 
production of urban space in colonial neighbourhoods cannot be understood solely 
through the binary analysis of top-down processes and policies. Rather, a deeper 
understanding demands acknowledging the bottom-up initiatives and their role, as 
Lefebvre suggests that one can see how a counter-space can insert itself into spatial 
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reality “against the Eye and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against 
power and the arrogance of power” (Lefebvre 1991, 382). 
At the contested boundaries of Jerusalem, it is not surprising to find radical 
urban frontiers manufactured by planning apparatus that as we detailed, have 
dominated the city since 1967. But the frontier neighbourhood, because of its ‘front 
line’ geographical location enables, to some extent, negotiation between Palestinian 
buyers and Jewish vendors, which in turn cracks the demographic homogeneity 
dictated by the colonial project.  
This is the paradox of current colonial urbanism in Jerusalem: on one hand, 
the forceful effect of the normalization of occupation was orchestrated by Israeli law, 
planning and state regulations that privilege Jewish citizens. On the other, the opening 
of the market – to all intents and purposes a normalization process – countered these 
policies and practices when it started attracting Palestinian population. Indeed,  
normalization has the potential to not only help the course of Judaization, but also 
may threaten it by breaking ethno-national dichotomies. To some extent this may be 
expected and it is worth considering the French Hill situation in a broader context: 
except in the most rigidly authoritarian cases, cities accommodate, at least to some 
extent, the flow of different urban populations. Even in heavily contested situations, 
like Jerusalem, there are at certain times and places some level of integration of ethnic 
groups. French Hill appears to reflect a version of this, despite the peculiarities of its 
own conditions. At the same time, it would be wrong to attempt to idealise such 
instability or to over-estimate the possibilities of interaction achieved from it, 
especially under conditions of duress such as the Palestinians experience. Relying on 
the possibilities offered by free-market housing through the 'Tosefet Aravi' as a 
vehicle for achieving the right to the city is problematic, primarily because it 
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overlooks the promise of the city to be a space for neighbouring. In this context we 
further conclude that neighbouring in its modern sense, with the full possibilities and 
demands of participation in a neighbourhood, demands equality, on both a legal and a 
practical level, which cannot be achieved in present colonial conditions on one hand 
and in the context of growing reliance on individuals' socio-economic mobility on the 
other.  
 
Bibliography 
Abowd, Thomas, 2007.  'National Boundaries, Colonized Spaces: The Gendered 
Politics of Residential Life in Contemporary Jerusalem', Anthropological 
Quarterly, 80 (4): 997-1034. 
Appadurai, Arjun, 1996. Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press 
Arendt, Hannah, (1958) 1989. The Human Condition. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press 
Balibar, Etienne, 1991. Race, Nation, Class, Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso 
Barzaki, Elinoar, 1989. “The location of the outer ring neighborhoods”. In Achimeir, 
O, (ed) The City Centre and the Outer Ring Neighbourhoods. (Jerusalem: The 
Jerusalem Center for Israel Study: 29-33 
Bauman, Zygmunt, 2003. Society Under Siege. Cambridge: Polity Press   
Bauman, Zygmunt,, 2006 Liquid Fear.  Cambridge: Polity Press 
Benhabib, Seyla, 2002. The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global 
Era. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press    
31 
 
Dahan-Kalev, Henriette, 2010. "Fear of Arabness", in Stephen Hessel and Michele 
Huppert (eds.), Fear Itself Reasoning the Unreasonable. Amsterdam and New 
York: Rodopi Press: 151-162. 
Gillette, Howard, 2010. Civitas by Design: Building Better Communities, from the 
Garden City to the New Urbanism. University of Pennsylvania Press 
Holston, James, 1989. The Modernist City - An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia. 
Chicago & London, University of Chicago Press  
International Peace Cooperation Report (IPCC), 2005. The Wall. Jerusalem: IPCC 
Katznelson, Ira, 1995. Social Justice, Liberalism and the City. In Morrifield, A. and 
Swyngedouw, E. (eds), The Urbanization of Injustice. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart: 45-6 
 Lefebvre, Henri, 1996. Writings on Cities. London: Blackwell 
Massey, Douglas and Denton, Nancy, 1993. American Apartheid. Harvard University 
Press  
Monterescu, Daniel, 2009.  'To Buy or Not to Be: Trespassing the Gated Community'. 
Public Culture 21(2): 403-430. 
Nitzan-Shiftan, Alona, 2004. 'Seizing Locality in Jerusalem', in N, AlSayyad, (ed.) 
The End of Tradition? London: Routledge: 231-255. 
 Pain, Rachel, and Smith, Susan, 2003.‘Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life’, 
in R. Pain and S. J. Smith, (eds) Fear: Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life. 
London: Ashgate: 1-19. 
 Pullan, Wendy, 2007. ‘Contested Mobilities and the Spatial Topography of 
Jerusalem’ in Contested Spaces: Cultural Representations and Histories of 
Conflict, eds., Louise Purbrick, Jim Aulich and Graham Dawson. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan: 49-73   
32 
 
Pullan, Wendy, 2011. 'Frontier urbanism: the periphery at the centre of contested 
cities', The Journal of Architecture 16 (1): 15-35. 
 Pullan, Wendy, Misselwitz, Phillip, Nasrallah Rami, and Yacobi, Haim, 2007.  
'Jerusalem's Road 1: An Inner City Frontier?' City 11(2): 176-198 
Rabinowitz, Dan, 1994. 'To sell or not to sell? Theory versus practice, public versus 
private, and the failure of liberalism: the case of Israel and its Palestinian 
citizens,' American Ethnologist, 21(4): 823-844. 
Robinson, Jennifer, 1997. 'The geopolitics of South African cities: states, citizens, 
territory', Political Geography, 16 (5): 365-86. 
Sandercock, Leonie, 2000.  'When Strangers become Neighbours: Managing Cities of 
Difference'. Planning Theory & Practice, 1 (1): 13-30. 
Tamari, Salim, 2011. ‘Confessionalism and Public Space in Ottoman and Colonial 
Jerusalem’, in Cities and Sovereignty. Identity politics in urban spaces, eds. D. 
E. Davis and N. Libertun de Duren. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian 
University Press: 59-8. 
Yacobi, Haim, 2008. 'Academic Fortress: the Planning of the Hebrew University 
Campus on Mount Scopus'. In D. Perry, and W, Wiewel, (eds.): Urban 
Universities and Development: the International Experience. Lincoln Institute 
of Land Policy, Cambridge: 257-272. 
Yiftachel, Oren and Yacobi, Haim, 2002. "Planning a Bi-National Capital: Should 
Jerusalem Remain United?" Geoforum 33: 137 -145 
